The Never-Ending Conflict by O\u27Neill, Steve
Furman Magazine
Volume 54
Issue 1 Spring 2011 Article 7
4-1-2011
The Never-Ending Conflict
Steve O'Neill
Furman University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarexchange.furman.edu/furman-magazine
This Article is made available online by Journals, part of the Furman University Scholar Exchange (FUSE). It has been accepted for inclusion in Furman
Magazine by an authorized FUSE administrator. For terms of use, please refer to the FUSE Institutional Repository Guidelines. For more information,
please contact scholarexchange@furman.edu.
Recommended Citation
O'Neill, Steve (2011) "The Never-Ending Conflict," Furman Magazine: Vol. 54 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarexchange.furman.edu/furman-magazine/vol54/iss1/7
On December 20, 2010, some 300 people paid $100 each to attend a “secession ball,” a 
celebration of South Carolina’s secession from the 
Union on the 150th anniversary of the event.
Billed by the event’s sponsor, the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, as “a joyous night of music, 
dancing, food and drink,” the party was held at 
Gaillard Auditorium in the heart of downtown 
Charleston, only blocks from the site of the original 
secession convention. Among the attendees were 
prominent business leaders, several state legislators, 
and a Charleston city councilman.
The gala, which included a theatrical 
re-enactment of the signing of the Ordinance 
of Secession, attracted extensive media attention. 
It also drew 150 protestors, white and black, includ-
ing the Rev. Joseph Darby, vice president of the 
Charleston NAACP, who denounced the “celebrat[ion] 
of a war which was fought for the right to maintain 
slavery.” But Mark Simpson, a commander of the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, offered a different 
view of the event — and of secession: “It was not 
about slavery. . . . We honor the men who wore the 
gray. We can understand what animated them
to defend their homes.”
 The secession ball and accompanying protest 
symbolized the ongoing divisions about the Civil War 
— a contest that has never quite ended for Americans, 
and that certainly tends to reignite passions when its 
major anniversaries arrive. These latter-day battles are 
not fought with bayonets and Dahlgren artillery but 
with arguments about secession and the larger meaning 
of the war.
The recent events in Charleston marked the start 
of the Civil War sesquicentennial, which was of!cially 
launched April 12 with a re-enactment of the !ring on 
Fort Sumter. So prepare yourself for four years of public 
debate over the meaning of the war.
And as we prepare for the commemorations 
of Manassas and Shiloh, Gettysburg and Vicksburg, 
perhaps it makes sense to put these modern-day events 
— the ones at the Gaillard Auditorium and the ones 
to follow across the state and nation — into historical 
context by examining some of the ways that the 
memory and meaning of secession and the war have 
changed over the years.
By Steve O’Neill
Citizens of Charleston watch 
the Confederate bombardment 
of Fort Sumter.
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STILL, as the sesquicentennial 
secession celebration in Charleston 
seems to con!rm, some remain 
convinced that secession was 
fundamentally a quest for self-
government and defense of 
liberty, and not concerned 
with defending slavery. 
How did we move from 
the frank admissions of the 
1850s and 1860s to explanations 
that de-emphasize slavery? The 
transformation is rooted in speci!c 
events during and after the war.
The South suffered devas-
tating losses on the battle!eld — 
260,000 sons, fathers, brothers and 
uncles. In South Carolina alone, 
21,000 men, one-third of the white 
male population between 18 and 
45, died. Nor was the civilian population spared, 
as Sherman burned a streak through the region.
In response, the white South and white 
South Carolinians shaped memories to justify 
their ignoble defeat and painful loss, on both 
a personal and social level. As one woman from 
Georgia put it, “In the shadow of defeat and 
humiliation, we needed to know that right and 
justice were ours.” They needed to believe that 
BROADER ISSUES in the culture of South Carolina, the South and the 
nation have shaped how succeeding generations have viewed secession and 
the war, while opening wide gaps between the way that historians have 
explained events and the way the general public has remembered them.
The public memory of the war has 
responded more to the hopes, needs and 
fears of the last 150 years than the events 
and evidence of the 1850s and 1860s, and 
academic historians have had a somewhat 
tangential role in shaping what people 
“know” about secession and the causes 
of the war. Some of that is surely the fault 
of the academics, who too often have written 
for one another rather than for the general 
public, but a more powerful reason is that  
historical memories rooted in strong emo-
tions tend to overwhelm even the most 
balanced and accurate scholarship. 
Indeed, this has frequently been the 
case on the question of secession in South 
Carolina. The debate that pitted the 
secession ball celebrants in Charleston 
against the protestors is not mirrored in 
how historians have interpreted secession 
in the state. On the contrary, historians 
have been united and clear in their under-
standing that South Carolina’s leadership 
seceded to defend slavery.
To be sure, historians have been alert 
to complexities when writing about secession. 
And nearly all would agree that a host of other issues attached themselves 
to those of slavery and abolition in South Carolina, among them property 
as a defense of liberty, a sense of manly honor, and fear of a race war 
sparked by abolition. Many of today’s historians would disagree on the 
relative impact of these auxiliary issues, but none would omit slavery as 
the chief cause of South Carolina’s decision to secede in December 1860.
The primary evidence is overwhelming, starting with the words 
of the state’s leaders. They made their case in unambiguous language. 
William Preston, a states’ rights advocate and president of South Carolina 
College, said in 1860, “Cotton is not our king — slavery is our king. Slavery 
is our truth. Slavery is our divine right.” Preston Brooks of Edge!eld, in-
famous for his 1856 assault on Massachusetts Sen. Charles Sumner on the 
"oor of the Capitol, said bluntly, “We of the South have no politics but the 
Negro.” Edward Bryan, a pamphleteer, demanded, “Give us slavery or give 
us death!” A.G. McGrath, mayor of Charleston at the time of secession 
and governor at the end of the war, said candidly in 1865, “Other con-
siderations attached themselves to slavery; but they were merely incidents 
to it; of themselves they could never have produced the same results.”
The Declaration of the Causes of Secession also pointed to slavery 
as the root cause. Written by Christopher Memminger and commissioned 
by the convention upon the occasion of its unanimous vote to secede, the 
document defended both slavery and the compact theory of government, 
which holds that the Constitution established a compact among the 
states, all of which maintained their right to 
sovereignty. The document also asserted that 
Lincoln’s Republicans intended to exclude 
slavery from the territories and extinguish 
slavery in the South, and cited unfair and 
unconstitutional practices by the North 
against slavery.
Is the Declaration of the Causes of 
Secession a defense of constitutional principles 
and liberty? Yes, on some level; but we must 
be clear that it defends the liberty to freely 
own slaves and the right to retrieve fugitive 
slaves. Only a reader blinded by the need to 
elevate high-minded principles over baser 
motives could fail to see slavery as the basis 
for Memminger’s justi!cation.
On the question of states’ rights and 
constitutional principles, the words of 
historian David Duncan Wallace are helpful. 
Wallace, a longtime Wofford professor, wrote 
a seminal history of South Carolina in 1934. 
He was born in Laurens County in the last 
days of Reconstruction, and his writings make 
clear that he was no liberal on race. About 
secession in South Carolina, he wrote: 
The theories for a constitutional defense were essentially practical.
If the slave-owner had faced dangerous opposition to slavery against 
which only the federal government could protect him, then he 
would have been expounding national sovereignty rather than state 
sovereignty. The constitutional argument was a mere attorney’s 
plea claiming everything for his client. . . . The secessionists knew 
why they seceded and in the various secession conventions they 
crowned endless reiterations of the cause with the strongest state-
ments of the threat to slavery as the cause. It is hardly conceivable 
that secession would have occurred if slavery had not existed.
To say that South Carolina seceded to defend slavery is not to say 
that there is no more to learn about the state and the causes of the war, 
or even about the state and secession. We can never retrieve the past 
with perfect !delity, so all the questions will never be answered. But 
professional historians must cite veri!able evidence and make arguments 
that will be scrutinized by their peers. In this context, explanations 
about secession in South Carolina that leave out slavery are misguided, 
if not thoroughly mistaken.
The ‘Lost Cause’ emerges
Regional Revisionism
Slavery & Secession
THE SOMBER AND STEADFAST TONE of 
the !rst iteration of the Lost Cause in the 1860s 
and ’70s was very different from the celebratory 
tenor that emerged around 1900 — and that 
was echoed at the Charleston gala in 2010. 
Reconstruction had ended by the turn 
of the century, and Southerners with personal 
memories of the war were giving way to the sons 
and daughters of veterans. The new generation 
recon!rmed the tenets of the Lost Cause, but 
replaced the feeling of de!ant justi!cation with 
one of celebration of the Confederacy and 
reconciliation with the North.
The economic and political reunion of 
North and South that took place after 1877 
in seceding from the Union, they had acted 
legally and morally.
In the !rst generation after the war, 
Southerners rewrote the past to try to heal 
what one novelist later termed the “Great 
Wound.” The speci!c way the defeated South 
reordered its past to cope with its present came 
to be called the “Lost Cause.” The term is 
borrowed from the title of a book written 
by Edward Pollard in 1866. Pollard’s book 
was one of many in the 1860s and ’70s 
that put forward four tenets about the war:
•  It had been a noble cause from 
 the start.
•  Liberty, not slavery, was the reason 
for secession.
•  Confederate soldiers had fought 
bravely and lost only because of 
the overwhelming numbers and 
resources of the Yankees.
•  Slaves and white women on the 
home front had remained loyal 
 to the cause until the bitter end.
For the war generation, rewriting 
the recent past proved helpful and maybe 
necessary on a psychological level. 
The idea of the Lost Cause helped lift 
the spirits of the South at a time when 
so much physical work was needed to rebuild 
the region. Former Civil War generals, such 
as Jubal Early, were particularly active in 
promoting the Lost Cause in memoirs and 
history books. Those with personal memories 
of the war were de!ant toward Yankees, 
Republicans and the federal government, 
and were not inclined toward reconciliation.
was mirrored in a revision in perspectives on 
the war in both regions. In the North, at a time 
of rising nationalism con!rmed by the War of 
1898, the meaning and memory of the Civil War 
shifted emphasis, from an effort to emancipate 
the slaves toward a quest to save the Union. 
Because this new theme downplayed slavery, 
it left the Lost Cause unchallenged and invited 
both sides to celebrate the valor of the troops in 
the !eld. In the process, the Northern memory 
of the war as an emancipationist effort was for-
gotten by all but a few African-American leaders, 
such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Frederick Douglass.
Indeed, this “reuni!cation” of North and 
South came about at the expense of blacks. 
In the 1890s the South, with both the tacit and 
active endorsement of the federal government, 
evaded the 14th and 15th amendments, which 
had been rati!ed to protect African-American 
civil and voting rights. In 1896, Plessy v. 
Ferguson upheld the South’s Jim Crow laws that 
discriminated against African Americans, and 
beginning in the 1890s Congress perennially 
consigned an anti-lynching bill to defeat. The 
meaning of freedom for former slaves and their 
descendants was left for the defeated white 
South, not the victorious North, to decide.
As the nation solidi!ed in law the status 
of blacks, Confederate heritage groups across the 
South also institutionalized the Lost Cause in 
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TODAY the sesquicentennial 
events have begun. Once again 
we renew our interest in a war 
whose !rst shots were !red 
150 years ago.
Since the 1961 centennial, 
countless books, !lms, documen-
taries and commentaries have
emerged to further our under-
standing — and, in some 
cases, to further obscure our 
understanding — of an era 
when the nation was divided 
against itself.  In the four 
years to come, we can expect 
hundreds of public events 
across the South and nation 
— re-enactments, symposia, 
exhibits, !lms and plays — 
that will shape the historical 
memory and meaning of the 
war for a new generation.
And with the past as our
guide, we can expect con-
temporary issues, needs and 
circumstances to weave their 
way into those upcoming 
commemorations, most likely 
in ways that will stir emotions, 
awaken regional biases and open old wounds.
It is telling that both the Obama administration and 
Congress have refrained from funding or appointing a national 
commission for the sesquicentennial. In deciding against 
a national commission, perhaps our current leaders are bowing 
to the present circumstances of !scal austerity. 
Then again, they don’t need the dif!cult lessons of the 
centennial in Charleston to remind them that the memory 
of the Civil War remains a dangerous battleground — even 
as the shooting recedes farther into the past. |F|
 
The author, a 1982 graduate, has been a history professor at Furman 
since 1987. Illustrations from North Wind Picture Archives.
history books, school curricula and monuments 
to the dead.
Three groups stand out. The United 
Confederate Veterans, founded in 1889, were 
former soldiers who promoted the Lost Cause 
mostly at reunions that continued well into 
the 20th century. The United Daughters of 
the Confederacy, founded in 1894, and the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, founded in 
1896, were even more determined than the 
veterans themselves to make concrete and 
permanent the memory of the war and the 
sacri!ce of their ancestors. Between 1894 
and 1911 (the 50th anniversary of the start 
of the war), the UDC and the SCV sponsored 
pageants, parades and commemorations, and 
built what is today the most lasting legacy 
of their efforts — monuments and statues to 
the Confederate cause that dot the Southern 
landscape from Virginia to Texas.
Perhaps a more powerful effort to promote 
the Lost Cause was what Confederate heritage 
groups called the “true history” movement, an 
organized push to write, publish and regulate the 
history of the Civil War and the Confederacy. 
From 1900 to 1915 or so, through the work of the 
UDC and a host of af!liated women’s clubs, the 
tenets of the Lost Cause became a catechism and 
a creed against which books, speeches, lectures 
and classroom lessons were measured. Teachers, 
authors and politicians were scrutinized to 
see if they conveyed the proper message about 
secession and the war, as well as the correct 
narratives of loyal slaves and steadfast soldiers.
The Lost Cause and its Northern 
counterpart, a war for reuni!cation, remained 
the predominant historical “memories” into the 
middle of the 20th century. Although individual 
historians, such as David Duncan Wallace, took 
issue with some particulars of the Lost Cause, the 
broad trends in the interpretation and writing of 
academic history did little to challenge popular 
perceptions of the war.
Nor were the dominant narratives 
challenged much by cultural and historical 
trends. African Americans remained second-
class citizens at mid-century. However, both 
the memory of emancipation and the place 
of blacks in contemporary American society 
were about to change.
Still A Dangerous!
Battleground !"#$%&%'()
!*)+('(++$!%
!"#"$%&'(&!)%&"%*"!+(",(%-.("%*"!+("/!#!("
%*"/%0!+"$#1%.)&#2"3(40&"#&5"+%.5(&"#!"
$%.063)#"%&"!+("/('(&!((&!+"5#7"%*"8(9(63(1"
)&"!+("7(#1"%*"%01":%15"%&("!+%0;#&5"()4+!"
+0&51(5"#&5";)<!7"#&5"!+(&9("9%&!)&0(5"37"
#5=%01&6(&!"!%"$+#1.(;!%&2"#&5"!+(1("37"5)'(1;"
#5=%01&6(&!;"!%"!+(">?(&!)(!+"5#7"%*"8(9(63(1
)&"!+(";#6("7(#1"@"
A&"B15)&#&9(">%"5);;%.'("!+("C&)%&"3(!?((&"
!+("/!#!("%*"/%0!+"$#1%.)&#"#&5"%!+(1"/!#!(;"
0&)!(5"?)!+"+(1"0&5(1"!+("9%6-#9!"(&!)!.(5"D>+("
$%&;!)!0!)%&"%*"!+("C&)!(5"/!#!(;"%*"A6(1)9#EF
G(2"!+(",(%-.("%*"!+("/!#!("%*"/%0!+"$#1%.)&#2"
)&"$%&'(&!)%&"#;;(63.(5"5%"5(9.#1("#&5"%15#)&2"
#&5")!");"+(137"5(9.#1(5"#&5"%15#)&(52">+#!"!+("
B15)&#&9("#5%-!(5"37"0;")&"$%&'(&!)%&2"%&"!+("
!?(&!7H!+)15"5#7"%*"I#7")&"!+("7(#1"%*"%01":%15"
B&(">+%0;#&5"/('(&"+0&51(5"#&5"()4+!"()4+!2"
?+(1(37"!+("$%&;!)!0!)%&"%*"!+("C&)!(5"/!#!(;"
%*"A6(1)9#"?#;"1#!)*)(52"#&5"#.;%"#.."A9!;"#&5"
-#1!;"%*"A9!;"%*"!+("J(&(1#."A;;(63.7"%*"!+);"
/!#!(2"1#!)*7)&4"#6(&56(&!"%*"!+(";#)5"
$%&;!)!0!)%&2"#1("+(1("37"1(-(#.(5K"#&5"!+#!"!+("
0&)%&"&%?";03;);!)&4"3(!?((&"/%0!+"$#1%.)&#"
#&5"%!+(1"/!#!(;2"0&5(1"!+("&#6("%*"D>+("C&)!(5"
/!#!(;"%*"A6(1)9#2F");"+(1(37"5);;%.'(5E
8%&("#!"$+#1.(;!%&2"!+("!?(&!)(!+"5#7"%*"8(9(6H
3(12")&"!+("7(#1"%*"%01":%15"%&("!+%0;#&5"()4+!"
+0&51(5"#&5";)<!7E
•••
!
THE EVENTS surrounding the 100th anniversary 
of the Civil War in 1961 illustrate the unpredictable 
relationship among popular memory, historical 
scholarship and contemporary culture.
In 1960 and 1961, careful plans for a unifying 
and non-controversial national centennial commemoration were dis-
rupted by sweeping changes in the South generated by the civil rights 
movement. The modern !ght for equality demanded a reconsideration 
of the Lost Cause and national reconciliation interpretations of the war.
In 1957, in the midst of the civil rights movement and at the 
height of the Cold War, Congress authorized a Civil War Centennial 
Commission, with 21 white appointees led by retired Gen. Ulysses 
S. Grant III, the grandson of the Union general. The commission 
was given money but no real power; it was conceived as an umbrella 
group over state commissions, which would actually carry out the 
commemorative events. As a result, the CWCC depended upon state 
commissions in the South controlled by adherents to the Lost Cause, 
who had found renewed strength and purpose in combating the push 
for civil rights.
President Dwight Eisenhower, imbued with the spirit of the Cold 
War, had saddled Grant and the CWCC with a mandate to emphasize 
the unity of the nation and thereby show the world that the United 
States stood !rm and united in the face of the communist threat. 
Grant, determined to follow Ike’s orders and to pull the Southern 
commissions on board, made a conscious decision to shape the 
themes of the centennial in favor of states’ rights, the Lost Cause 
and a !ght to save the Union — and to essentially 
ignore emancipation.
What some might have considered a sound 
decision in 1957 looked very different by the spring 
of 1961, when the CWCC, the nation and South 
Carolina prepared to commemorate the war’s 100th anniversary. Between 
1957 and 1961 Eisenhower was forced to send troops to desegregate Little 
Rock’s Central High, and subsequent federal court decisions began the 
desegregation of the South. 
With the question of African-Americans’ freedom and citizenship 
in the headlines and in the minds of the nation, the CWCC planned 
to hold its convention at the segregated Fort Sumter Hotel in Charleston. 
When the management of the hotel refused a reservation request from 
a black member of the New Jersey state centennial commission, the 
Northern state commissions threatened a boycott. 
U.S. Grant held !rm against the Northern states’ protest. However, 
newly inaugurated president John F. Kennedy intervened, and in one 
of the !rst decisions of his presidency he moved the CWCC convention 
to cramped quarters at the nearby Charleston Naval Base. The episode 
proved a public relations disaster for the CWCC, and the of!cial 
national commemoration never recovered. Grant resigned and was 
replaced by Columbia University historian Allen Nevins, who insisted 
on a thematic balance that included emancipation, slavery and a 
counter-narrative to the Lost Cause. In response, the Southern com-
missions repeated history, seceding from the national commemoration 
to hold their own centennial celebrations.
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TODAY the sesquicentennial 
events have begun. Once again 
we renew our interest in a war 
whose !rst shots were !red 
150 years ago.
Since the 1961 centennial, 
countless books, !lms, documen-
taries and commentaries have
emerged to further our under-
standing — and, in some 
cases, to further obscure our 
understanding — of an era 
when the nation was divided 
against itself.  In the four 
years to come, we can expect 
hundreds of public events 
across the South and nation 
— re-enactments, symposia, 
exhibits, !lms and plays — 
that will shape the historical 
memory and meaning of the 
war for a new generation.
And with the past as our
guide, we can expect con-
temporary issues, needs and 
circumstances to weave their 
way into those upcoming 
commemorations, most likely 
in ways that will stir emotions, 
awaken regional biases and open old wounds.
It is telling that both the Obama administration and 
Congress have refrained from funding or appointing a national 
commission for the sesquicentennial. In deciding against 
a national commission, perhaps our current leaders are bowing 
to the present circumstances of !scal austerity. 
Then again, they don’t need the dif!cult lessons of the 
centennial in Charleston to remind them that the memory 
of the Civil War remains a dangerous battleground — even 
as the shooting recedes farther into the past. |F|
 
The author, a 1982 graduate, has been a history professor at Furman 
since 1987. Illustrations from North Wind Picture Archives.
history books, school curricula and monuments 
to the dead.
Three groups stand out. The United 
Confederate Veterans, founded in 1889, were 
former soldiers who promoted the Lost Cause 
mostly at reunions that continued well into 
the 20th century. The United Daughters of 
the Confederacy, founded in 1894, and the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, founded in 
1896, were even more determined than the 
veterans themselves to make concrete and 
permanent the memory of the war and the 
sacri!ce of their ancestors. Between 1894 
and 1911 (the 50th anniversary of the start 
of the war), the UDC and the SCV sponsored 
pageants, parades and commemorations, and 
built what is today the most lasting legacy 
of their efforts — monuments and statues to 
the Confederate cause that dot the Southern 
landscape from Virginia to Texas.
Perhaps a more powerful effort to promote 
the Lost Cause was what Confederate heritage 
groups called the “true history” movement, an 
organized push to write, publish and regulate the 
history of the Civil War and the Confederacy. 
From 1900 to 1915 or so, through the work of the 
UDC and a host of af!liated women’s clubs, the 
tenets of the Lost Cause became a catechism and 
a creed against which books, speeches, lectures 
and classroom lessons were measured. Teachers, 
authors and politicians were scrutinized to 
see if they conveyed the proper message about 
secession and the war, as well as the correct 
narratives of loyal slaves and steadfast soldiers.
The Lost Cause and its Northern 
counterpart, a war for reuni!cation, remained 
the predominant historical “memories” into the 
middle of the 20th century. Although individual 
historians, such as David Duncan Wallace, took 
issue with some particulars of the Lost Cause, the 
broad trends in the interpretation and writing of 
academic history did little to challenge popular 
perceptions of the war.
Nor were the dominant narratives 
challenged much by cultural and historical 
trends. African Americans remained second-
class citizens at mid-century. However, both 
the memory of emancipation and the place 
of blacks in contemporary American society 
were about to change.
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